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1 Introduction
In recent decades, many countries have been strengthening their protection of intellectual property
rights (IPR) by reforming their patent systems. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which entered into eﬀect in 1995, has intensified the policymakers’
concerns for patent policies. For example, Park (2008) provides an index of patent rights on a scale
of 0-5 (a larger number implies stronger protection) and shows that the strength of patent rights in
the US increased from 0.74 in 1960 to 4.88 in 2005.1
In general, it is widely believed that stronger patent protection enables the patent holders to obtain
greater rent from charging a higher price. In turn, it is likely that this process promotes innovation,
thereby increasing productivity and economic growth.2 However, recent empirical studies cannot
verify a clear monotonically positive correlation between patent protection and economic growth
(e.g., Gould and Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006; Qian, 2007; Lerner, 2009). Instead, these studies
indicate the possibility of a nonmonotonic relationship between patent protection and economic
growth. For example, Qian (2007) evaluates the eﬀects of patent protection on pharmaceutical
innovations for 26 countries that established pharmaceutical patent laws from 1978–2002 and finds
that there appears to be an optimal level of intellectual property rights regulation above which
further enhancement reduces innovative activities.3
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀects of patent protection on economic growth in a continuous-time
overlapping generations (OLG) model as in Blanchard (1985) with lab-equipment type R&D-based
growth as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). We show that increasing patent breadth may generate
an inverted-U eﬀect of patents on economic growth, an eﬀect which is partly consistent with an
empirically observed nonmonotonic relationship between patent protection and economic growth.4
1Park (2008) examines five categories of patent rights (patent duration, coverage, enforcement mechanism, restric-
tions on patent scope, and membership in international treaties) and assigns a score from 0 to 1.
2This may not be the case if we consider sequential innovation. In this case, stronger patent protection may impede
sequential innovation. See Chu et al. (2012a) for example.
3In addition, Table 2 in Gould and Gruden (1996) shows that the per capita income growth rate of countries with
middle-level patent protection is lower than that of countries with the second-lowest level of patent protection.
4Aghion et al. (2005) find evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation by using
panel data. Since increasing patent breadth implies reduced competition in the current model, the finding of this paper
is consistent with the evidence provided by Aghion et al. (2005).
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Intuitively, broader patent breadth increases the proportion of income that goes to monopolistic
profits and increases the equilibrium interest rate, leading to a conventional positive eﬀect on eco-
nomic growth through the enhancement of innovation activities (the “interest rate eﬀect"). However,
this scenario also has a potentially negative eﬀect on economic growth by enlarging the growth-
reducing eﬀect of “generation-turnover", which arises in the overlapping generations framework
because a fraction of older and therefore wealthier individuals die and they are replaced by poorer
newborns with less accumulated wealth (the “generation-turnover eﬀect"). It is known that the ex-
tent of the generation-turnover eﬀect is determined by the equilibrium per capita asset-consumption
ratio because this ratio captures the relative diﬀerences in aggregate per capita consumption in
the economy and the consumption by newborns. The higher interest rate caused by the broader
patent breadth motivates households to save more for their future consumption and increases the
equilibrium per capita asset-consumption ratio. Under the lab-equipment type R&D specification,
the value of innovations is determined by the price of final goods through a zero profit condition
in the R&D sector and is independent of the patent breadth. Combinations of these two factors
increase the equilibrium per capita asset-consumption ratio, enlarge the growth-reducing eﬀects of
“generation-turnover", and thus negatively aﬀect economic growth.
We also show that our paper’s inverted-U eﬀect of patent breadth on economic growth depends
upon our lab-equipment type R&D specification. If we follow Romer (1990) and consider the
knowledge-driven R&D specification, where R&D activities require labor inputs, the growth-
reducing “generation-turnover eﬀect" disappears. Therefore, the broader patent breadth always
increases economic growth through the growth-enhancing “interest rate eﬀect". Intuitively, under
the knowledge-driven R&D specification, R&D activities require labor inputs, and the value of
innovations is positively related to the equilibrium wage rate through a zero profit condition in
the R&D sector. The lower wage rate caused by the broader patent breadth decreases the value
of innovations, decreases the equilibrium per capita asset-consumption ratio, and thus completely
cancels out the growth-reducing eﬀect of “generation-turnover". Therefore, under the knowledge-
driven R&D specification, the broader patent breadth always increases economic growth through the
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growth-enhancing “interest rate eﬀect". Our analyses show that the combinations of heterogeneous
households with finite lifetime and the lab-equipment type R&D specification are relevant for
deriving the inverted-U eﬀect of patent protection on economic growth.5
This study relates most closely to the macroeconomic literature of patent policy and economic
growth. The seminal study in this literature is that of Judd (1985), who finds that an infinite
patent length maximizes economic growth. However, subsequent studies (e.g., O’Donoghue and
Zweimuller, 2004; Furukawa, 2007; Horii and Iwaisako 2007; Chu et al., 2012 a,b) show that
strengthening patent protection in various forms could generate a nonmonotonic eﬀect on economic
growth.6 Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) also show that the contrasting eﬀects of patent breadth
on innovation and physical capital accumulation may generate an inverted-U eﬀect of patents on
economic growth.
However, most of these studies have focused on the economies of an infinitely living homoge-
neous household. Chou and Shy (1993) and Sorek (2011) are two exceptional studies that analyze
the growth implications of patent policy in an OLG framework of finitely living households.7 Using
a two period OLG model of an expanding-variety growth, Chou and Shy (1993) show that, under
one-period patent length, investment in new innovations is always higher than under infinite patent
length, because young agents can buy no existing patents from old agents and must invest all their
savings in new innovations.8 In accordance with Chou and Shy (1993), Sorek (2011) develops a
two period OLGmodel of quality-ladder growth and clarifies the parameter conditions under which
the shorter patent length enhances economic growth. However, to the best of my knowledge, there
are no existing studies that analyze the growth implications of patent policy in a continuous-time
5Similar to our study, Chu et al. (2012b) develops a R&D growth model with elastic labor supply and finds that
increasing patent breadth may generate an inverted-U eﬀect on innovation depending on whether the model features
the knowledge-driven or lab-equipment driven innovation process.
6Examples include O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) on leading breadth and patentability requirements, Fu-
rukawa (2007) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) on patent protection against imitation, and Chu et al. (2012b) on patent
breadth. See Chu et al. (2012a) for a more comprehensive literature review.
7Diwakar et al.(2018) also develop a two period OLG model of expanding-variety growth with physical capital
accumulation. As with Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), the researchers show that the contrasting eﬀects of patent
breadth on innovation and physical capital accumulation may generate an inverted-U eﬀect of patents on economic
growth.
8Chou and Shy (1993) refers to this eﬀect as the “crowding-out eﬀect of the long duration of patents".
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OLG framework.9 Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature of patent policy and eco-
nomic growth by highlighting novel interactions between the “generation-turnover eﬀect" and the
innovation process through which patent protection has an inverted-U eﬀect on economic growth.
This study also relates to the literature of factor shares and economic growth (e.g., Bertola 1993,
1996; Bertola et al. 2006). Stronger patent protection increases the proportion of income that goes
to monopolistic profits, which, in turn, reduces the proportion of income that goes to workers. In
particular, this paper closely relates to that of Bertola (1996), who examines the eﬀects of factor
shares on economic growth in a simple AK type endogenous growth model. Bertola (1996) shows
that the eﬀect of factor shares on economic growth depends crucially on the assumptions of saving
behaviors. In the standard infinite horizon optimizing model of balanced-growth, aggregate savings
are positively related to private rates of return on investment or, for a given technology, the share of
capital of production in aggregate income. Therefore, distributing income from labor to capital is
beneficial for growth. However, in an overlapping generations model, higher rates of return on an
older agent’s wealth imply lower disposable income for young laborers with a high saving propensity.
Consequently, distributing income from labor to capital may be harmful for growth under certain
parameter conditions. Our paper’s inverted-U eﬀect of patent protection on economic growth in
an OLG framework is partly indebted to this Bertola (1996) seminal contribution. However, by
employing an R&D-based growth model, this paper focuses on the growth implications of patent
policy that aﬀect incentives for innovations more directly. Thus, this paper complements the
analyses conducted by Bertola (1996). This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the basic model. Section 3 analyzes the eﬀect of patent breadth on economic growth under the
lab-equipment type R&D specification. Section 4 briefly considers the knowledge-driven R&D
case. Section 5 concludes the paper.
9Olivier (2000) constructed a continuous-time overlapping generationsmodel with variety expansion type innovation
to show that speculative bubbles may promote innovation and growth.
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2 Model
To analyze the eﬀect of patent protection on economic growth, we consider a continuous-time OLG
model as in Blanchard (1985) with lab-equipment type R&D-based growth as in Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991). The economy consists of age-specific heterogeneous households whose lifetime is
finite. For production, three sectors exist: a final goods sector, an intermediate goods sector, and
an R&D sector. In accordance with Goh and Olivier (2002), we introduce patent breadth into the
model.
2.1 Basic Assumptions
The population of an economy consists of diﬀerent cohorts that are distinguishable by their date of
birth denoted as j. Each cohort j consists of a measure L j(v) of households at time v ≥ j, where
j ∈ (−∞, v) is the cohort index and v ∈ (−∞,∞) is continuous calendar time. Each household
encounters an age-independent instantaneous risk of death µ, which is assumed to be exogenous
and constant, as in Blanchard (1985). Thus, the probability that a household born at time j survives
until time v ≥ j is given by e−µ(v− j). Moreover, due to the law of large numbers, the value of µ also
refers to the fraction of households dying at each instant.
At every instant of time, a new cohort is born. The birth rate of the economy is denoted by λ,
which is assumed to be exogenous and constant, as in Buiter (1988). Hence, the size of the cohort
born at time v is given by λL(v), where L(v) is the size of the whole population in the economy
at time v. Without loss of generality, we set L(0) to L. Thus, population grows at the rate of
b = λ − µ, where λ − µ > 0, and the size of the whole population in the economy at time v is given
by L(v) = Le(λ−µ)v = Lebv.
Since the size of the cohort born at time j is given by λL( j) and every household confronts an
age-independent instantaneous risk of death µ, the size of the cohort j at time v ≥ j is given by
L j(v) = λL( j)e−µ(v− j) = λLe(λ−µ) je−µ(v− j) = λLeλ je−µv. Therefore, the size of the cohort j relative
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to the whole population at time v is given by
L j(v)
L(v) =
λLeλ je−µv
Le(λ−µ)v
= λeλ( j−v). (1)
2.2 Households
The expected lifetime utility of the household born at time j (i.e., cohort j) is
UEj =
∫ ∞
j
ln[c j(v)]e−(ρ+µ)(v− j)dv, (2)
where c j(v) is the consumption at time v for a household born at time j and ρ > 0 is the subjective
time discount rate. As in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), we assume that every household
insures themselves against the risk of dying with positive assets by using their savings to buy
actuarial notes of a fair life insurance company. Therefore, under the assumption of the perfectly
competitive annuity market, those who survive at time v receive the insurance premium µ as well as
the interest rate r(v). Consequently, the budget constraint of the household born at time j is given
by
Ûa j(v) = [r(v) + µ]a j(v) + w(v) − c j(v), (3)
where a j(v) is the asset holdings at time v for a household born at time j, and w(v) is the wage
rate at time v. Note that the newly born household receives no share of existing wealth; that is,
av(v) = 0. Moreover, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), all assets are held by the form of the
shares of monopolistic firms.
The household maximizes (2) for the consumption subject to (3). We obtain the household’s
consumption Euler equation and the transversality condition as follows:
Ûc j(v)
c j(v) = r(v) − ρ, (4)
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lim
v→∞ a j(v) exp
[
−
∫ v
j
{r(x) + µ}dx
]
= 0. (5)
Integrating (3) with respect to v over v ∈ [t,∞), and using (4) and (5) yield consumption at time t
for a household born at time j:
c j(t) = (µ + ρ)
[
a j(t) + h(t)
]
, (6)
where
h(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
w(v) exp
[
−
∫ v
t
{r(x) + µ}dx
]
dv.
Here, h(t) represents the human wealth (i.e., the present value of the expected future labor income).
In addition, since at(t) = 0, the relation ct(t) = (µ + ρ)h(t) holds.
2.3 Aggregation
Recalling the fact that the size of the cohort j relative to the whole population at time v is given by
(1), we can define the aggregate per capita asset holdings at time t, a(t) and the aggregate per capita
consumption at time t, c(t), as follows:
a(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
a j(t)
L j(t)
L(t) dj =
∫ t
−∞
a j(t)λeλ( j−t)dj, (7)
c(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
c j(t)
L j(t)
L(t) dj =
∫ t
−∞
c j(t)λeλ( j−t)dj . (8)
Substituting (6) into (8) and using (7), we obtain
c(t) = (µ + ρ)[a(t) + h(t)]. (9)
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Moreover, diﬀerentiating (8) with respect to t and using (9), as shown in Appendix A, we can write
the dynamics of c(t) as:
Ûc(t)
c(t) = r(t) − ρ − λ(µ + ρ)
a(t)
c(t) , (10)
where we have that (µ + ρ)a(t)c(t) = c(t)−ct (t)c(t) . The third term on the right side of (10) reports the
diﬀerence in aggregate per capita consumptions in an economy and consumptions by newborns.
Note that the aggregate per capita consumptions in an economy c(t) is always higher than the
consumptions of newborns ct(t) because newborns have no accumulated assets. Consequently, the
aggregate per capita consumption expenditure growth in (10)will always be lower than the individual
consumption growth in (4) because a fraction of µ of older and therefore wealthier individuals die,
and they are replaced by poorer newborns. Since the latter can aﬀord less consumption than the
former, the turnover of generations slows the aggregate consumption expenditure growth compared
to individual consumption expenditure growth.
2.4 Final goods sector
Final goods Y (t) are produced by competitive firms.
Y (t) = A · Ly(t)1−α
∫ N(t)
0
xi(t)αdi, (11)
where A > 0 is a productivity parameter, Ly(t) is production labor, xi(t) is the intermediate good i,
and N(t) is the number of intermediate goods. Given the price of the intermediate goods pi(t) and
wage rate w(t), the profit maximization yields
w(t) = (1 − α) Y (t)
Ly(t), (12)
pi(t) = αALy(t)1−αxi(t)α−1. (13)
As explained below, labor is used only for final goods production. Thus, the labor market clearing
condition becomes Ly(t) = L(t).
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2.5 Intermediate goods sector
There is a continuum of intermediate goods i ∈ [0,N(t)]. One unit of intermediate goods is produced
with a units of final good inputs. A single firm holding the patent monopolistically supplies each
intermediate good i. The profit function of each intermediate good firm is pii(t) = [pi(t) − a]xi(t).
The familiar unconstrained profit-maximizing price is pi(t) = aα . Here, we follow Goh and Olivier
(2002) to introduce patent breadth β > 1 as a policy variable such that pi(t) = max
{
β, 1α
}
a.10 We
focus on the interesting case in which β ∈ (1, 1α ). Consequently, a broader patent breadth β enables
the monopolistic firms to charge a higher markup capturing Gilbert and Shapiro’s (1990) seminal
insight on “breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price".11 Substituting pi(t) = p(t) = βa
into (13) and pii(t) = [pi(t) − a]xi(t) shows that relations xi(t) = x(t) and pii(t) = pi(t) hold for all
i ∈ [0,Nt]. Therefore, henceforth, we can omit the index i. Under these specifications, the profit of
each intermediate good firm satisfies
pi(t) = β − 1
β
p(t)x(t) = β − 1
β
αY (t)
N(t) , (14)
where the second equality follows from (13), Ly(t) = L(t) and Y (t) = AL(t)1−αN(t)x(t)α. Thus,
substituting p(t) = βa into (14) yields
x(t) = α
βa
Y (t)
N(t) . (15)
Hence, using (15), we can rewrite Y (t) = AL(t)1−αN(t)x(t)α as follows:
Y (t) = A˜(β)L(t)N(t), (16)
10Generally, governments control the degree of patent protection through patent length and breadth. In this paper,
for simplicity, we assume that the patent length is fixed and infinite and that governments control the degree of patent
protection using only patent breadth.
11Specifically, we assume that the broader the government makes patent breadth, the more diﬃcult it is to produce
imitative goods. We specify the unit cost of producing imitative goods as βa. Each firm that produces an intermediate
good charges a price such that producers of imitative goods cannot earn positive profits, as follows: pi(t) = βa.
10
where
A˜(β) ≡ A1/1−α(α/βa)α/1−α > 0.
Since β A˜
′(β)
A˜(β) = − α1−α < 0, we can see that a broader patent breadth negatively aﬀects the volume of
final goods production through its distortional eﬀects on factor inputs allocations.
2.6 R&D Sector
Denote Vi(t) as the value of the patent on variety i ∈ [0,Nt]. pii(t) = pi(t) from (14) implies that
Vi(t) = V(t) for all i ∈ [0,N(t)]. If households possess one unit of stock in the time interval dt, they
can obtain a profit of pi(t) and a capital gain or loss of ÛV(t). Alternatively, households can invest
V(t) units of funds in the risk-free asset. Therefore, in equilibrium, the no-arbitrage condition for
V(t) is
r(t)V(t) = pi(t) + ÛV(t). (17)
Competitive entrepreneurs employ R&D inputs for innovation. In accordance with Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991), we consider the lab equipment type R&D specification. Devoting η(t) units of
the final good, R&D firms can invent one unit of intermediate goods. We assume that the R&D cost
η(t) is given by ηL(t), which expresses the dilution eﬀect that removes the scale eﬀect, as in Laincz
and Peretto (2006). Given the value of the patent on variety V(t), the zero profit condition yields
V(t) = η(t) = ηL(t). (18)
With noting that ÛV(t)/V(t) = ÛL(t)/L(t) = b from (18), combining (14), (16), (17) and (18) yield
r(t) = α
η
Ω(β) + b ≡ r(β), (19)
where Ω(β) ≡ β−1β A˜(β). Since Ω′(β) = 1β
[
1−αβ
(β−1)(1−α)
]
Ω(β) > 0 and r′(β) = αηΩ′(β) > 0, a broader
patent breadth positively aﬀects the equilibrium interest rate.
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2.7 Market clearing conditions
The final goods are used for household consumption, the intermediate goods production, and R&D
investments. Thus, the final goods market clearing condition becomes
Y (t) = c(t)L(t) + ax(t)N(t) + ηL(t) ÛN(t). (20)
In addition, the asset market clearing condition is given as
a(t)L(t) = N(t)V(t). (21)
3 Patent policy and economic growth
3.1 Equilibrium dynamics
The dynamic system of the economy for a given patent breadth β is illustrated by the following
equations:
ÛN(t)
N(t) =
1
η
[
β − α
β
A˜(β) − c˜(t)
]
, (22)
Ûc(t)
c(t) = r(β) − ρ − λ(µ + ρ)
η
c˜(t), (23)
where c˜(t) ≡ c(t)/N(t). Note that (22) is obtained from (15), (16) and (20); (23) is obtained from
(10), (18), (19) and (21), respectively.
Summarizing equations (22) and (23), we can obtain the following diﬀerential equation of c˜(t):
Û˜c(t)
c˜(t) = −
(1 − α)A˜(β)
η
+ b − ρ − λ(µ + ρ) η
c˜(t) +
c˜(t)
η
≡ Γ(c˜(t); β), (24)
where Γc˜(c˜; β) ≡ ∂Γ(c˜; β)/∂c˜ = 1η + λ(µ + ρ) ηc˜2 > 0, Γc˜c˜(c˜; β) ≡ ∂Γc˜(c˜; β)/∂c˜ = −λ(µ + ρ)
η
c˜3 < 0,
limc˜→0 Γ(c˜; β) = −∞, limc˜→∞ Γ(c˜; β) = ∞ and Γβ(c˜; β) ≡ ∂Γ(c˜; β)/∂β = −1−αη A˜′(β) > 0. Figure
1 describes the dynamic properties of c˜(t) in (24) showing that there exists a unique steady state
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c˜∗(β) that is unstable (i.e., c˜∗(β) ≡ {c˜ | Γ(c˜; β) = 0}). This finding implies that the forward looking
variable c˜(t) must jump to c˜∗(β) at the initial date. Otherwise, the monotonic dynamics of c˜(t)
would lead to either 0 or ∞, which contradicts the equilibrium conditions.12 From (24), we can
derive c˜∗(β) explicitly as
c˜∗(β) = η
2
〈
ρ +
(1 − α)A˜(β)
η
− b +
{[
ρ +
(1 − α)A˜(β)
η
− b
]2
+ 4λ(µ + ρ)
} 1
2
〉
, (25)
where c˜∗β(β) ≡ ∂c˜∗(β)/∂β and
c˜∗β(β)β
c˜∗(β) = −
α
η
A˜(β){[
ρ +
(1−α)A˜(β)
η − b
]2
+ 4λ(µ + ρ)
} 1
2
< 0. (26)
Since c˜∗β(β) < 0, we can see that the broader patent breadth negatively aﬀects the equilibrium
consumption-number of intermediate goods ratio.
In the steady state equilibrium, since the per capita output y(t) is given by y(t) ≡ Y (t)L(t) = A˜(β)N(t)
from (16), c(t), N(t) and y(t) grows at the same balanced-growth rate γ. From (23), the balanced-
growth rate γ is determined by the following equation:
γ = r(β) − ρ − λ(µ + ρ) η
c˜∗(β) ≡ γ(β). (27)
3.2 Eﬀects of patent breadth on economic growth
In this subsection, we examine the eﬀects of patent breadth on the balanced-growth rate γ. By
diﬀerentiating (27) with respect to β, we obtain
∂γ(β)
∂β
=
α
η
Ω′(β) + λ(µ + ρ)η
(
1
c˜∗(β)
)2
c˜∗β(β). (28)
12First, c˜(t) = 0 leads to cj(t) = 0 and violates the first order conditions. Second, c˜(t) = ∞ violates the resource
constraints of final goods given by (21).
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By substituting (26) and Ω′(β) = 1β
[
1−αβ
(β−1)(1−α)
]
Ω(β) into (28) and rearranging them, we obtain the
following expression:
β
∂γ(β)
∂β
=
α
η
A˜(β)Φ(β), (29)
where
Φ(β) ≡ 1 − αβ(1 − α)β − λ(µ + ρ)
η
c˜∗(β)
1{[
ρ +
(1−α)A˜(β)
η − b
]2
+ 4λ(µ + ρ)
} 1
2
.
Note thatΦ(β) satisfies the following properties: ∂Φ(β)∂β < 0, limβ→1Φ(β) =
[
ρ+
(1−α)A˜(1)
η −b
]
c˜∗(1)+λ(µ+ρ)η[
ρ+
(1−α)A˜(1)
η −b
]
c˜∗(1)+2λ(µ+ρ)η
>
0, and limβ→ 1α Φ(β) = −λ(µ + ρ)
η
c˜∗( 1α )
1{[
ρ+
(1−α)A˜( 1α )
η −b
]2
+4λ(µ+ρ)
} 1
2
< 0. Because sign[ ∂γ(β)∂β ] =
sign[Φ(β)] from (29), the above properties of Φ(β) show that there exists a unique βop ∈ (1, 1α )
such that ∂γ(β
op)
∂β = 0,
∂γ(β)
∂β > 0 ∀β ∈ [1, βop) and ∂γ(β)∂β < 0 ∀β ∈ (βop,1/α]. There-
fore, as depicted in Figure 2, suppose that the parameter conditions ensure that the relation
γ(βop) > 0 holds; we can demonstrate that there exists a unique βop ∈ (βmin, βmax) such that
γ(βop) > γ(β) ∀β ∈ [βmin, βmax], ∂γ(β)∂β > 0 ∀β ∈ [βmin, βop), and ∂γ(β)∂β < 0 ∀β ∈ (βop, βmax]
where βmin = max{1, βl}, βmax = min{βu,1/α}, βl, βu ≡ {β | γ(β) = 0} and βu > βl .13 Figure 2
depicts the case where the relations βl > 1 and βu > 1α hold.14 These results are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the parameter conditions ensure that the relation γ(βop) > 0 holds,
and an inverted-U relationship exists between patent breadth and the balanced-growth rate in a
continuous-time OLG model with a lab-equipment type R&D growth.
.
Note that the conditions γ(βop) > 0 are necessary for our economy to have parameter regions
to ensure a positive balanced-growth rate. From (27), patent breadth β aﬀects the balanced-growth
rate γ via the following two eﬀects: the “interest rate eﬀect" (the first term of the right side of
13From (27), the parameter conditions for γ(βop) > 0 are given by r(βop) − ρ − λ(µ + ρ) ηc˜∗(βop ) > 0.
14Of course, other cases (i.e., βl > 1 and βu < 1α ; βl < 1 and βu >
1
α ; βl < 1 and βu <
1
α ) might hold under certain
parameter configurations.
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(27)) and the “generation-turnover eﬀect" (the third term of the right side of (27)). Let us first
explain the “interest rate eﬀect". From (14), the broader patent breadth increases the share of
income that is attributed to monopolistic profits. Since the value of innovations (monopolistic
firms) V is determined by the price of final goods through a zero profit condition in the R&D sector
(i.e., equation (18)) and is independent of the patent breadth under the lab-equipment type R&D
specification, the increase in monopoly profits caused by the broader patent breadth increases the
equilibrium interest rate, as shown in (19), and thus increases the balanced-growth rate. Therefore,
the “interest rate eﬀect" positively aﬀects the balanced-growth rate.
Let us next explain the “generation-turnover eﬀect". From (10) and (27), the generation-turnover
term under the lab-equipment type R&D specification is given by λ(µ + ρ)a(t)c(t) = λ(µ + ρ) ηc˜∗(β) .
Since c˜∗β(β) < 0 from (26), the broader patent breadth increases the equilibrium per capita asset-
consumption ratio a(t)c(t) , and thus decreases the balanced-growth rate γ. Therefore, the “generation-
turnover eﬀect" negatively aﬀects the balanced-growth rate. Intuitively, from (4), the rise in interest
rate caused by the broader patent breadth motivates households to save more for their future
consumptions (increases the consumption growth rate of each household), which positively aﬀects
the equilibrium per capita asset-consumption ratio. In addition, under the lab-equipment type
R&D specification, the value of innovations (monopolistic firms) V is determined by (18) and is
independent of the patent breadth. Combinations of these two factors increase the equilibrium per
capita asset-consumption ratio, enlarges the growth-reducing eﬀects of generation-turnover, and
thus negatively aﬀects the balanced growth rate.
As the patent breadth enlarges, the positive interest rate eﬀect decreases due to the diminishing
marginal eﬀects of patent breadth on monopoly profits, whereas the negative generation turn-over
eﬀect increases due to the gradual increase in the equilibrium per capita asset-consumption ratio.
Therefore, an inverted-U relationship exists between the patent breadth and the balanced-growth
rate under the lab-equipment type R&D specification.
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4 The knowledge-driven R&D specification
Before concluding this paper, we should note that our paper’s inverted-U eﬀect of patent breadth on
economic growth depends upon our lab-equipment type R&D specification. To clarify this point,
we consider an alternative R&D specification. In accordance with Romer (1990), we consider the
knowledge-driven R&D specification, where R&D activities require labor inputs. However, to avoid
lexicographic explanations, we relegate the detailed analysis of the knowledge-driven R&D case
to the Appendix B. Appendix B shows that, under the knowledge-driven R&D specification, the
broader patent breadth always increases economic growth through the growth-enhancing “interest
rate eﬀect". The growth-reducing “generation-turnover eﬀect" disappears in the knowledge-driven
R&D case. Intuitively, as in the lab-equipment R&D case, the higher interest rate caused by the
broader patent breadth motivates households to save more for their future consumption, increases
the equilibrium per capita asset-consumption ratio, and thus enlarges the growth-reducing eﬀect
of generation-turnover. However, under the knowledge-driven R&D specification, R&D activities
require labor inputs, and the value of innovations is positively related to the equilibrium wage rate
through a zero profit condition in the R&D sector. The lower wage rate caused by the broader patent
breadth decreases the value of innovations, decreases the equilibrium per capita asset-consumption
ratio, and thus completely cancels out the abovementioned growth-reducing eﬀect of generation-
turnover. Therefore, the growth-reducing “generation-turnover eﬀect" disappears, and the broader
patent breadth always increases economic growth through the growth-enhancing “interest rate
eﬀect". The analyses in Appendix B clarify that the combinations of heterogeneous households
with finite lifetimes and the lab-equipment type R&D specification are relevant for deriving the
inverted-U eﬀect of patent protection on economic growth.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed how patent protection aﬀects economic growth in a continuous-time OLG
model with a lab-equipment type R&D-based growth. We showed that increasing patent breadth
16
may generate an inverted-U eﬀect of patents on economic growth, which is partly consistent with an
empirically observed nonmonotone relationship between patent protection and economic growth.
We also showed that the combinations of heterogeneous households with a finite lifetime and a
lab-equipment type R&D specification are relevant for deriving the inverted-U eﬀect of patent
protection on economic growth.
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Appendix A: Derivation of (10)
By diﬀerentiating (8) with respect to t, we obtain
Ûc(t) = λct(t) − λc(t) +
∫ t
−∞
Ûc j(t)λeλ( j−t)dj . (30)
Substituting (4) into (30) and using (8) yield
Ûc(t)
c(t) = r(t) − ρ − λ
c(t) − ct(t)
c(t) . (31)
Using (9) and ct(t) = (µ + ρ)h(t) from (6), (31) can be rewritten as (10).
Appendix B: knowledge-driven R&D case
In this section, we examine the knowledge-driven R&D case. Contrary to the lab-equipment R&D
case, we show that the broader patent breadth always increases the balanced-growth rate.
Minor changes
The structures of the households, the final goods sector, and the intermediate goods sector are
the same as the lab-equipment R&D case. In accordance with Romer (1990), we consider the
knowledge-driven R&D specification where R&D activities require labor inputs. To reflect this
change, equation (16) is rewritten as
Y (t) = A˜(β)Ly(t)N(t). (32)
In addition, from (12) and (32), we obtain
w(t) = (1 − α) Y (t)
Ly(t) = (1 − α)A˜(β)N(t). (33)
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R&D Sector
Competitive entrepreneurs employ R&D labor inputs for innovation. Devoting η(t) units of labor
inputs, R&D firms can invent one unit of intermediate goods. As in Laincz and Peretto (2006), we
assume that the R&D cost η(t) is given by ηL(t)N(t) . Given the value of the patent on variety V(t), the
zero profit condition yields
V(t) = w(t)ηL(t)
N(t) = η(1 − α)A˜(β)L(t). (34)
where the second equality follows from (33). The no-arbitrage condition is the same as the lab-
equipment R&D case (i.e., equation (17)). Thus, noting that ÛV(t)/V(t) = ÛL(t)/L(t) = b from (34),
combining (14), (17), (32), and (34) yield
r(t) = 1
η
β − 1
β
α
1 − α
Ly(t)
L(t) + b. (35)
Market clearing conditions
Labor is used for final goods production and R&D investments. Thus, the labor market clearing
condition becomes
L(t) = Ly(t) + ηL(t)N(t)
ÛN(t). (36)
The final goods are used for consumption and intermediate goods production. The final goods
market clearing condition is given as
Y (t) = c(t)L(t) + ax(t)N(t). (37)
The asset market clearing condition is the same as the lab-equipment R&D case (i.e., equation (21)).
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Equilibrium Dynamics
By substituting (15) and (32) into (37) and rearranging them, we obtain
Ly(t)
L(t) =
β
β − α
c˜(t)
A˜(β), (38)
where c˜(t) ≡ c(t)/N(t). Using (38), (35) is rewritten as
r(t) = 1
η
α
1 − α
β − 1
β − α
c˜(t)
A˜(β) + b. (39)
Thus, by substituting (38) into (36), we can express the dynamics of N(t) as follows:
ÛN(t)
N(t) =
1
η
[
1 − β
β − α
c˜(t)
A˜(β)
]
. (40)
In addition, combining (10), (21), (34) and (39) yields
Ûc(t)
c(t) = r(t) − ρ − λ(µ + ρ)
η(1 − α)A˜(β)
c˜(t) . (41)
Summarizing equations (40) and (41), we can obtain the following diﬀerential equation of c˜(t):
Û˜c(t)
c˜(t) =
1
η
1
1 − α
c˜(t)
A˜(β) − λ(µ + ρ)
η(1 − α)A˜(β)
c˜(t) −
1
η
+ b − ρ ≡ ΓK(c˜(t); β), (42)
where ΓKc˜ (c˜; β) ≡ ∂ΓK(c˜; β)/∂c˜ = 1η 11−α 1A˜(β) + λ(µ + ρ)
η(1−α)A˜(β)
c˜2 > 0, Γ
K
c˜c˜(c˜; β) ≡ ∂ΓKc˜ (c˜; β)/∂c˜ =
−2λ(µ+ρ)η(1−α)A˜(β)c˜3 < 0, limc˜→0 ΓK(c˜; β) = −∞, limc˜→∞ ΓK(c˜; β) = ∞ and ΓKβ (c˜; β) ≡ ∂ΓK(c˜; β)/∂β =
−A˜′(β)
[
c˜
η(1−α)
(
1
A˜(β)
)2
+
λ(µ+ρ)η(1−α)
c˜
]
> 0. As in the lab-equipment R&Dcase, there exists a unique
steady state c˜K∗(β) that is unstable (i.e., c˜K∗(β) ≡ {c˜ | ΓK(c˜; β) = 0}). This finding implies that
the forward looking variable c˜(t) must jump to c˜K∗(β) at the initial date. From (42), we can derive
c˜K∗(β) explicitly as
c˜K∗(β) = κη(1 − α)A˜(β), (43)
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where κ ≡
1
η+ρ−b+
{(
1
η+ρ−b
)2
+4λ(µ+ρ)
} 1
2
2 . Since c˜
K∗
β (β) = κη(1 − α)A˜′(β) < 0, we can see that the
broader patent breadth negatively aﬀects the equilibrium consumption-number of the intermediate
goods ratio. In the steady state equilibrium, from (32), (38) and (43), the per capita output y(t) is
given by y(t) = ββ−α c˜K∗(β)N(t). Therefore, c(t), N(t) and y(t) grow at the same balanced-growth
rate γK . In addition, from (39) and (43), the equilibrium interest rate is given by
r(t) = α(β − 1)
β − α κ + b ≡ r
K(β). (44)
Therefore, by substituting (43) and (44) into (41), the balanced-growth rate γK is determined by the
following equation:
γK = rK(β) − ρ − λ(µ + ρ)1
κ
≡ γK(β). (45)
Eﬀects of patent breadth on economic growth
In this subsection, we examine the eﬀects of patent breadth on the balanced-growth rate γK . By
diﬀerentiating (45) with respect to β, we obtain
∂γK(β)
∂β
=
∂rK(β)
∂β
=
α(1 − α)
(β − α)2 κ > 0, ∀β ∈
(
1,
1
α
]
. (46)
These results indicate that the broader patent breadth always increases the balanced-growth rate.
In addition, the conditions γK( 1α ) > 0 are necessary for our economy to have at least parameter
regions, which ensure a positive balanced-growth rate.15
From (45), as in the lab-equipment R&D case, patent breadth β aﬀects the balanced-growth rate
γK via the following two eﬀects: the “interest rate eﬀect" (the first term of the right side of (45))
and the “generation-turnover eﬀect" (the third term of the right side of (45)), while the parameter β
is included only in the first term.
Let us first explain the “interest rate eﬀect". From (14) and (35), as in the lab-equipment R&D
15From (45), the parameter conditions for γK ( 1α ) > 0 are given by r( 1α ) − ρ − λ(µ + ρ) 1κ > 0.
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case, the broader patent breadth increases the share of income that is attributed to monopolistic prof-
its, which directly increases the equilibrium interest rate (i.e., “direct eﬀect"). In addition, from (33),
the broader patent breadth negatively aﬀects the equilibriumwage rate. Under the knowledge-driven
R&D specification, R&D activities require labor inputs, and the value of innovations (monopolistic
firms)V is positively related to the equilibriumwage rate through a zero profit condition in the R&D
sector (i.e., equation (34)). Thus, the lower wage rate caused by the broader patent breadth leads
to the lower equilibrium value of innovations (monopolistic firms). Although, the lower value of
innovation (monopolistic firms) exerts both positive and negative eﬀects on the equilibrium interest
rate through general equilibrium eﬀects, it eventually leads to a higher equilibrium interest rate (i.e.,
“asset price eﬀect"). This finding implies that the “asset price eﬀect" also increases the equilibrium
interest rate. Due to these “direct eﬀect" and “asset price eﬀect", the broader patent breadth in-
creases the equilibrium interest rate, as shown in (44), and thus increases the balanced-growth rate.
Therefore, the “interest rate eﬀect" positively aﬀects the balanced-growth rate.
Let us next explain the “generation-turnover eﬀect". From (10) and (45), the generation-
turnover term under the knowledge-driven R&D specification is given by λ(µ+ ρ)a(t)c(t) = λ(µ+ ρ)1κ .
This finding implies that the patent breadth has no eﬀect on the equilibrium asset-consumption
ratio a(t)c(t) . Intuitively, as in the lab-equipment R&D case, the higher interest rate caused by the
broader patent breadth motivates households to save more for their future consumptions, increases
the equilibrium per capita asset-consumption ratio, and thus enlarges the growth-reducing eﬀect
of generation-turnover. However, under the knowledge-driven R&D specification, the value of
innovations (monopolistic firms)V is determined by (34) and is positively related to the equilibrium
wage rate. The lower wage rate caused by the broader patent breadth decreases the value of
innovations (monopolistic firms), decreases the equilibrium per capita asset-consumption ratio, and
thereby completely cancels out the abovementioned growth-reducing eﬀect of generation-turnover.
Therefore, the growth-reducing “generation-turnover eﬀect" disappears in the knowledge-driven
R&D case, and the broader patent breadth always increases economic growth through the growth-
enhancing “interest rate eﬀect". The above analyses clarify that the combinations of heterogeneous
22
households with a finite lifetime and the lab-equipment type R&D specification are relevant for
deriving the inverted-U eﬀect of patent protection on economic growth.
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